Teams are becoming increasingly important in work settings. We develop a framework to study the strategic implications of a meritocratic notion of desert under which team members care about receiving what they feel they deserve. Team members …nd it painful to receive less than their perceived entitlement, while receiving more may induce pleasure or pain depending on whether their preferences exhibit desert elation or desert guilt. Our notion of desert generalizes distributional concern models to situations in which e¤ort choices a¤ect the distribution perceived to be fair; in particular, desert nests inequity aversion over money net of e¤ort costs as a special case. When identical teammates share team output equally, desert guilt generates a continuum of symmetric equilibria. Equilibrium e¤ort can lie above or below the level in the absence of desert, so desert guilt generates behavior consistent with both positive and negative reciprocity and may underpin social norms of cooperation.
Introduction
Teams have become increasingly important in work settings in recent years (Che and Yoo, 2001 , document a number of examples). The growing popularity of teams is driven partly by the increasing complexity of work tasks in a knowledge-driven environment. This increasing complexity means that tasks require the input of many di¤erent complementary skills and makes monitoring and legally verifying the value of individual contributions more di¢ cult, thus leading to a greater use of teams with some form of output sharing.
Equity considerations are likely to play an important role when agents work together in teams. Team members will often be able to observe the performance of other team members, and team incentive schemes make team members'payo¤s interdependent. Accordingly, if individual contributions to the team output vary across team members, rewarding team members with an equal share of the team output may "cause feelings of intraorganizational inequity: better performers are likely to feel inequitably treated when they are rewarded at the same level as poor performers in the same organization" (Lawler and Jenkins, 1992) . Conversely, worse performers may feel that they have received more than they deserve. 1 In this paper we develop a theoretical framework to study the strategic implications of desert considerations when agents work in teams. The increasing preponderance of teamwork makes understanding the incentives of team members more relevant than ever. A better understanding of incentives within teams that incorporates the implications of agents'desert concerns will provide a more solid foundation for future research to answer broader questions, such as: when will agents choose to join or form teams? when should employers use teams? how should employers design optimal team compensation? can employers help foster cooperation in teams by, e.g., providing information about the e¤orts of teammates or the e¤orts of others in similar teams? should pro…tsharing partnerships be taxed di¤erently from other types of companies? 2 Our analysis complements that of Gill and Stone (2010) , who study the implications of desert in competitive settings in which payo¤s are stochastic and reference points are expectations-based.
Here we study implications of desert in a cooperative setting in which payo¤s are deterministic. 1 In Section 2, we review the empirical evidence on the importance of equity considerations in team settings and more generally. 2 Our focus is on the impact of non-standard desert preferences on strategic behavior within teams under the simplest equal-sharing rule, which, as we document in footnote 4, is commonly used in teams. Holmstrom (1982) and Che and Yoo (2001) consider, in a static and dynamic context respectively, the choice of optimal team contract by a principal given standard preferences. In these papers, the principal is not constrained to use sharing rules that distribute output equally; indeed, the chosen contract does not even need to be budget balancing (i.e., payments are allowed to exceed output). We hope this paper will spur future research on how the multiplicity of equilibria that we …nd with desert preferences interacts with a principal's choice of optimal team contract.
We develop a meritocratic notion of desert or equity under which each team member compares her monetary payo¤ to the payo¤ that she feels she deserves, which depends on how hard she has worked in relation to her teammates. When a team member receives less than she feels she deserves, she su¤ers a psychological cost which we call a desert loss. It is less clear whether she will view getting more than she deserves as a good thing or a bad thing, so we allow for both. We say that she bene…ts from desert elation if she feels good about getting more than she feels she deserves.
When, instead, she feels bad about getting more than she feels she deserves, we say that she su¤ers from desert guilt. Such feelings of guilt may be triggered by a desire to conform with a meritocratic social norm according to which the distribution of payo¤s should re ‡ect recipients'e¤orts. 3 Section 2 expounds our meritocratic notion of desert in more detail, relating it to the existing literature on equity and explaining how we formalize our notion using loss aversion around endogenous reference points. A signi…cant body of empirical evidence from social psychology and experimental economics supports the idea that equity and desert are important when agents exert e¤ort. However, the literature has not embedded desert in a formal framework suitable for studying its strategic implications.
Section 3 presents the formal model, which we apply in Section 4 to analyze the implications of desert for equilibrium e¤ort choices in teams. When identical teammates share the team output equally, desert guilt generates a continuum of symmetric equilibria: some of these equilibria generate more e¤ort than without desert; but, more surprisingly, other equilibria generate less e¤ ort than when desert considerations are absent. Desert guilt forges an endogenous complementarity between agents' e¤orts by giving the agents incentives to match the e¤orts of their teammates, and so generates behavior that is consistent with both positive and negative reciprocity. However, as outlined in Section 4.2, the mechanism that introduces reciprocity into our framework is di¤erent from that which drives intentions-based theories of reciprocal altruism. When desert guilt leads to cooperative behavior, the guilt can be thought of as underlying social norms of cooperation: desert guilt can make cooperation normatively appropriate for an agent, conditional on her teammates adhering to the norm of cooperative behavior. Thus desert guilt, which as noted above may itself be underpinned by a meritocratic social norm, can give rise to a speci…c norm of cooperation in our team setting. With desert elation, e¤ort is always driven below the no-desert level as the team members feel no compunction about taking advantage of their teammates by slacking o¤. We also study the welfare implications of desert in Section 4.4.
The theoretical implications of desert in team settings in which an agent's e¤ort confers a positive externality on her teammates are very di¤erent to those in settings in which agents compete and so impose negative externalities on rivals. As noted above, Gill and Stone (2010) consider the implications of desert in a competitive environment, …nding that when agents compete desert concerns push identical agents to di¤ erentiate their e¤ort levels, with some agents working very hard and others slacking o¤ substantially. Eisenkopf and Teyssier (2013) provide support for this prediction using evidence from a laboratory experiment. The fact that desert concerns imply such di¤erent predictions across these di¤erent settings is evidence of the scope and portability of our notion of desert. Desert concerns may in ‡uence behavior in any situation in which agents exert e¤ort, and an agent's payo¤ depends on her own e¤ort as well as on the e¤orts of some other agents that she interacts with.
Our notion of desert can be seen as a generalization of distributional concern models to situations in which e¤ort choices a¤ect the distribution that is perceived to be fair or equitable. Desertconcerned agents care not just about the distribution of monetary payo¤s, but also about how the distribution came about. Indeed, our conception of desert is related to the inequity-aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , and one of the aims of our paper is to clarify this relationship. In Section 5, we show that in a team setting our model of desert nests Fehr and Schmidt (1999)-type inequity aversion over monetary payo¤s net of e¤ ort costs as a special case. Inequity aversion over money net of e¤ort costs implies one particular way to weight monetary payo¤s in relation to e¤ort exerted, while our notion of desert does not prescribe the exact form that this weighting should take.
In Section 6 we study a simple linearized example that allows us to calculate explicit analytical expressions for the range of possible equilibria. We also use the linear example to study how desert concerns a¤ect the optimal team size. We hope that this example will prove useful in future applied theoretical and empirical work. In Section 7, we consider the extent to which our results carry through when agents have heterogeneous desert preferences. Section 8 concludes.
Desert in teams
In this section, we outline our general notion of desert in teams and link it to the existing literature.
We start by describing our team setting. A set of identical agents are members of a team: the agents exert costly e¤ort to help produce some team output that is shared equally among the team members. 4 Output sharing implies that each agent's e¤ort confers a positive externality on her teammates. We also suppose that agents observe each other's contributions to the team output, while the contract setter cannot observe (or at least legally verify) individual e¤orts and so cannot condition payments directly on e¤ort. This is a natural assumption when agents work together closely in a team, and it is commonly assumed in theoretical work on teams (see, e.g., Che and Yoo, 2001, and Kvaløy and Olsen, 2006) . Finally, we abstract from one common feature of team production by assuming that the team production function does not exhibit complementarities in team members' e¤orts. We do this because our aim is to focus on the consequences of desert concerns for team production. In particular, we show that desert concerns create an endogenous complementarity: they give teammates an incentive to match one another's e¤orts in order to ensure that they receive their just deserts.
We capture a notion of desert or equity by supposing that each agent cares about how her monetary payo¤ compares to how much she feels she deserves, where this is given by a reference point r i that depends on how hard agent i has worked in relation to her teammates. We also suppose that the agents share a common notion of desert and so agree about the payo¤ each deserves. Our general notion of desert is meritocratic: speci…cally, we assume that if an agent works harder than a teammate, she feels that she deserves more than that teammate, while if she works less hard she 4 Equal-sharing rules are common in team settings. Hamilton et al. (2003) , for example, study the impact of a team incentive scheme in a garment factory under which teams received a group piece rate for each garment they produced as a team and the team's net receipts were divided equally among members. And Knez and Simester (2001) discuss a …rm-wide bonus scheme used by the airline Continental, which promised 65 dollars to every hourly employee in every month that Continental's on-time performance ranked among the top …ve in the industry. More generally, partnerships often divide pro…ts equally among partners. Encinosa et al. (2007) , for example, analyze survey data on medical practices that was collected in 1978, …nding that 54.2% of small medical-group practices (de…ned as practices of 3-5 physicians), which constituted 46% of all practices in their data, employed an equal-sharing rule (p.199). Unsurprisingly, a lower percentage of larger practices used an equal-sharing rule. But equal sharing was prevalent even in large practices: 6.9% of practices with 25 to 49 physicians and 31.4% of those with more than 50 physicians employed such a rule (p.199). Farrell and Scotchmer (1988) have data on law …rms in 1980 that suggests that equal-sharing rules are common in law …rms too. They report that most two or three-person law …rms, which account for about two-thirds of all …rms in their data, employed a system in which all members with the same seniority received the same pro…t share. As they explain, since "junior partners eventually become senior partners, such a system would be equal division if the …rm's pro…tability were constant over time" (p. 293). Farrell and Scotchmer also report that salmon …shermen in the Paci…c Northwest adhere to what amounts to an equal-sharing norm: they tell each other where the …sh are while refraining from making side payments "thus sharing the e¢ ciency gains from better information" (p. 279). feels that she deserves less. 5 Letting e i represent agent i's e¤ort:
We suppose that desert-motivated agents feel hard done by when they receive less than they feel they deserve, while feelings of elation or guilt are possible when they do better than they deserve. We operationalize our notion of desert by assuming that each agent is loss averse around her reference point, so losses relative to the deserved reference point are more painful than gains are pleasurable;
indeed, doing better than is felt to be deserved may induce psychologically painful guilt rather than elation. Loss aversion captures the central stylized fact that has emerged from the empirical literature on reference-dependent preferences: losses relative to reference points loom larger than corresponding gains (see Rabin, 1998, and DellaVigna, 2009 , for surveys, and the original paper by Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . In the terminology of K½ oszegi and Rabin (2007) , the reference points in our setup are choice-acclimating and thus endogenous: the agents understand and anticipate how their e¤ort choices in ‡uence their reference points. Gill and Stone (2010) consider a similar notion of desert, but in a competitive context where e¤orts impose a negative externality on rivals, and where there is uncertainty about agents'ultimate payo¤s so that an agent's deserved reference point is given by her expected winnings. In a competitive tournament setting, Gill and Prowse (2012) …nd experimental evidence of the importance of loss aversion around choice-acclimating reference points. 6
Although little theoretical work has been carried out to model desert concerns formally, 7 a 5 Our meritocratic notion of desert explicitly incorporates relative concerns: whether an agent feels that she deserves more or less than a teammate depends on whether she has worked more or less hard than that teammate. How hard an agent has worked could be measured in two ways: …rst, in terms of her individual investment or input, here measured by her 'cost of e¤ort' (which gives the agent direct disutility); or second, in terms of her individual production or output that enters the team production function, here measured by her 'e¤ort'. We have written our general notion of desert in terms of e¤ort, but given our setting with identical agents we could equally well have written (1) in terms of cost of e¤ort: an agent's e¤ort exceeds that of a teammate if and only if her cost of e¤ort also exceeds that of her teammate. If agents were not identical, but instead di¤ered in their cost of e¤ort functions, the distinction between individual investments and individual production would become relevant. In settings without a team production component, a 'libertarian' notion of distributive justice or fairness says that the fair distribution should depend on what each agent produces, while the 'liberal egalitarian'notion of distributive justice says that the fair distribution should depend on relative investments (see Cappelen et al., 2007) . Applied to our team production setting, and if the agents di¤ered in their cost of e¤ort functions, the 'libertarian' notion would thus suggest that whether an agent deserves more than another should depend on relative e¤orts, while the 'liberal egalitarian'notion would suggest that desert should depend instead on relative costs of e¤ort. 6 Daido and Murooka (2011) show that when workers are loss averse around choice-acclimating expectations, a principal might choose to use a 'team'contract under which one worker's pay increases in the performance of another in order to mitigate wage uncertainty. 7 An exception is Konow (2000) , who considers only the optimal division of output by a dictator for given e¤ort choices. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) invoke equity considerations to motivate an e¤ort-supply function that is sensitive to the wage an agent receives relative to the wage she believes to be fair. signi…cant body of literature supports the idea that people are motivated by a meritocratic notion of desert. Rabin (1998) writes that "desert will obviously be relevant in many situations -and the massive psychological literature on 'equity theory'shows that people feel that those who have put more e¤ort into creating resources have more claim on those resources" (p. 18). Adams (1965) was the …rst modern proponent of equity theory: his work in social psychology led him to conclude that "when [a person] …nds that his outcomes and inputs are not in balance in relation to those of others, feelings of inequity result"(p. 280) and that "there can be little doubt that inequity results in dissatisfaction, in an unpleasant emotional state, be it anger or guilt" (p. 283). Using survey data, Konow (1996) distills an accountability principle according to which a person's entitlement varies in direct proportion to the value of his relevant discretionary variables, relative to others (p.
19).
Experimental evidence also backs up the idea that people are sensitive to considerations of desert. For example, Konow (2000) , Frohlich et al. (2004) and Cappelen et al. (2007) …nd evidence that in dictator games in which the amount to be distributed re ‡ects agents'e¤orts, dictators tend to award a higher payo¤ to agents who have exerted more e¤ort, while Abeler et al. (2010) show that when norms of equity are violated because harder working agents are paid the same as those who exert less e¤ort, the harder working agents start to withdraw e¤ort, even though it would be in their interest to continue to work hard in the absence of social preferences. Finally, in an experimental setting with di¤erent productivities, Gantner et al. (2001) classify subjects according to their equity standards.
The evidence referred to in the above two paragraphs that people care about equity considerations suggests that desert guilt is a more realistic assumption than desert elation in our team production context. When a team member receives more than she deserves, others receive less, and so if team members are genuinely motivated by the kind of fairness considerations that underlie equity theory, they should experience desert guilt when they receive more than they feel entitled to.
Further evidence that desert guilt is the more common motivational tendency among those who are sensitive to desert concerns comes from studies of team incentive schemes, which …nd that teams perform surprisingly well, at least under conditions in which team members can monitor each other's performance, contrary to the standard refrain that team incentives will lead to free-riding (see, e.g., Knez and Simester, 2001 , Hamilton et al., 2003 , and Boning et al., 2007 . Experimental evidence also shows that there is less free-riding than standard theory predicts in team production games in which subjects contribute real e¤ort (see, e.g., van Dijk et al., 2001 , Mohnen et al., 2008 , and Corgnet et al., 2011 . Further evidence comes from Babcock et al. (2011) , who conduct a …eld study in which team incentives (speci…cally a bonus that is paid only if both members of a team spend time studying or going to the gym a speci…ed number of times) intensify the e¤ort exerted by team members relative to an individual incentive scheme, a result they argue is attributable to the guilt team members experience when they let the team down. 8 As we show in Section 4.4 below, when team members experience desert guilt the Pareto-dominant equilibrium involves more e¤ort than if team members are self-interested or experience desert elation (which reduces e¤ort below the self-interested level); if the agents succeed in coordinating on this equilibrium, then freeriding will be mitigated. The real-e¤ort team production settings referenced above closely mimic our setup and so provide support for the existence of desert preferences with desert guilt and a reference point that depends on agents'relative contributions to the team.
Yet, even if desert guilt seems like the more plausible assumption, we think it makes sense to consider the possibility that agents experience desert elation for two reasons. First, the evidence suggests that there is heterogeneity in fairness preferences. For example, in a dictator game experiment by Frohlich et al. (2004) in which dictators are asked to divide an amount of money that is generated by the e¤orts of the dictator and a recipient, some dictators leave the recipient all that he deserves given their relative productivity, others leave none, while others leave an intermediary amount. Second, whether fairness perceptions matter to agents may depend on the speci…cs of the situation. While there is evidence that the basic tenets of equity theory are widely shared across di¤erent cultures (Konow, 2000) , the salience of fairness considerations may vary depending on the social norms that govern the particular decision-making context. Contextual manipulations of the choice environment in dictator games can substantially alter behavior by altering subjects' sense of what is normatively appropriate (see, e.g., Krupka and Weber, 2013) . And so it may be that a person's aversion to getting more than she deserves is context dependent.
Formal model
We now imbed our notion of desert that we described above in Section 2 into a formal model.
Team production game
N 2 identical agents simultaneously choose e¤ort e i 0 at cost C (e i ) ; with C(0) = C 0 (0) = 0;
C 0 > 0 for e i > 0; C 00 > 0 and C 0 unbounded above. Team output Y depends on the sum of
The team output is distributed equally, so each agent receives a monetary payo¤ y i = Y =N , which the agent values at (y i ) with (0) = 0; 0 > 0 and 00 0: 9 The agents can produce output as part of the team but not individually (perhaps because access to a crucial means of production is tied to the team).
In the absence of desert preferences, to be introduced shortly, each agent has a twice continuously di¤erentiable utility function U i (e i ; e i ) = (y i ) C (e i ) ; which depends on the agent's own e¤ort e i and the vector of e¤orts chosen by the other team members e i . 10 We call U i agent i's standard utility.
Desert preferences
As explained in Section 2, we capture agents'desert concerns by supposing that each agent cares not only about her monetary payo¤ and e¤ort cost, but also about how the monetary payo¤ y i compares to a reference point r i that represents the payo¤ that the agent feels she deserves. We suppose that each agent's endogenous reference point is given by r i (e i ; e i ) ; which is continuously di¤erentiable when P N i=1 e i > 0 and, letting r 0 i @r i =@e i and z i represent a common level of e¤ort e j = z 8j 6 = i, satis…es the following assumption:
Part (i) says that the identical agents adopt a meritocratic notion of desert such that if all agents exert a common level of e¤ort z, each agent feels she deserves an equal N th share of the resulting team output, while if agent i exerts more (less) e¤ort than the common level of the other team members, she feels she deserves more (less) than the equal N th share y i that she receives. 9 It is straightforward to extend our analysis to the case where each individual's output is partially or fully non-rival in consumption. Each team member then receives yi = aY N = af N ; where a ranges from 1 to N as we move from full rivalry to full non-rivalry, so we can simply replace f by af throughout. 1 0 Although agents are identical and so share the same utility function, we …nd it useful to subscript utility and some other functions with an i to denote the particular agent's identity.
Part (i) follows from our general notion of desert (1), if we assume that P N i=1 r i = Y; so that the amounts felt to be deserved sum to the team output available for distribution. Part (ii) says that, starting from a common e¤ort level z; the payo¤ that agent i feels she deserves increases faster in her own e¤ort e i than does her actual payo¤, which is equivalent to saying that the share of team output felt to be deserved is strictly increasing. 11 Part (ii) follows from part (i) in non-pathological cases. 12 Each agent's utility U i is assumed to take the following separable form:
where desert utility D ( (y i ) (r i )) represents the reference-dependent utility that the agent experiences from comparing her monetary payo¤ to her reference point. Desert utility depends on
; that is, on the di¤erence between the material utility derived from the agent's share of output and the material utility associated with receiving the deserved reference point. It is important to emphasize that in this formulation an agent's reference point is choice-acclimating and hence endogenous: as the agent changes her e¤ort choice, her reference point adjusts, and the agent anticipates this when deciding how hard to work.
We let desert utility D (4 i ) be a continuous function with D (4 i ) = L (4 i ) when 4 i < 0;
D (4 i ) = 0 when 4 i = 0 and D (4 i ) = G (4 i ) when 4 i > 0: Since 0 > 0, 4 i T 0 , (y i ) T (r i ) , y i T r i . Thus, L (4 i ) represents the desert utility associated with situations in which y i < r i , so the agent receives less than she feels she deserves. In such cases, we say that the agent su¤ers a desert loss, and we assume that L (4 i ) < 0 for all 4 i < 0, so such losses are always unambiguously painful. G (4 i ) represents the desert utility when y i > r i , so the agent receives more than she feels she deserves. When G (4 i ) > 0; we say the agent derives desert elation from 4 i > 0: she gains pleasure from doing better than deserved. When G (4 i ) < 0 we say the agent su¤ers desert guilt from 4 i > 0: doing better than is felt to be deserved induces a psychological 1 1 The share felt to be deserved is given by r i f and the derivative of this share with respect to ei is given by
; with strict inequality in non-pathological cases.
cost which we call guilt. 13 Letting G 0 (0) lim 4 i #0 G 0 (4 i ) ; we de…ne local and global desert guilt and elation as follows:
As discussed in Section 2, we assume that each agent is loss averse around her choice-acclimating endogenous reference point. In particular, letting L 0 (0) lim 4 i "0 L 0 (4 i ) ; we assume that desert utility D(4 i ) is di¤erentiable everywhere away from 4 i = 0; that L 0 (0) > 0; and that L 0 (0) > G 0 (0).
Thus, in the limit as the deviation from the reference point tends to zero, desert losses remain painful and desert losses are more painful than any desert elation is pleasurable: the agents are loss averse for small stakes. This corresponds to Assumption A4 in K½ oszegi and Rabin's (2006) formal description of loss aversion, and implies a kink in utility at the reference point. 14 Models of loss aversion generally also assume loss aversion for large stakes, weak convexity in the loss domain and weak concavity in the gain domain (Assumptions A2 and A3 in K½ oszegi and Rabin, 2006) , but our results do not require such assumptions.
Examples
To …x ideas, we now provide a few concrete examples of desert preferences which satisfy the assumptions outlined above. We start by presenting three plausible forms for the reference point. All three satisfy Assumption 1 and our general notion of desert (1). First, an agent could feel that she deserves a share of team output equal to her share of e¤ort, so:
This reference point function is an example of the 'classic proportionality'fairness principle. According to Almås et al. (2011, p. 490) : "The classical proportionality principle is a well-known responsibility-sensitive fairness principle, where income is distributed in proportion to each individual's claim and where the claim is given by the value of the factor for which the individual is responsible. For example, if we assume that the number of working hours is the only responsibility factor, then a person's claim is equal to the number of hours worked. In this case, the classical proportionality principle assigns to each individual a share of the total income that is equal to his share of the total number of hours worked."In (3) an individual's 'e¤ort', which measures the individual's production or output that enters the team production function, is taken to be the relevant responsibility factor.
Second, the agent might feel that she deserves a share of team output equal to her share of the cost of e¤ort, so:
This reference point function is another example of classic proportionality, where now an individual's 'cost of e¤ort', which measures the individual's investment or input that gives her direct disutility, is taken to be the relevant responsibility factor.
Finally, the agent could feel that she deserves an equal share of the team output that would have been produced had everybody worked as hard as she did, so:
This reference point function is related to the 'egalitarian equivalent'fairness principle, which is an alternative responsibility-sensitive fairness principle to the classic proportionality principle (Bossert and Fleurbaey, 1996) . Almås et al. (2011) present two di¤erent versions. According to the version represented by equation (9) at p.497, the fair distribution to agent i is given by what the average level of pre-tax income in the economy would have been had everybody's vector of responsibility factors matched that of agent i (together with a uniform transfer designed to ensure that the total of the fair distributions matches actual production). The setting in Almås et al. (2011) is not directly applicable to our team production setting, since pre-tax income is allowed to vary only in individuals'own vector of characteristics. However, Bossert (1995, p. 3) notes that "A possible generalization... would be to allow pre-tax incomes to depend on the entire characteristics pro…le."
Given such a generalization, and when e¤ort is taken to be the responsibility factor, this version of the egalitarian equivalent principle gives our reference point (5), except for the uniform transfer (which is zero in the case of our linear example in Section 6). 15 Next, we present one simple piecewise-linear form for desert utility D (4 i ) which satis…es our assumptions on desert utility outlined above. We present this example for illustrative purposespiecewise linearity is not required for our equilibrium results in Section 4. With piecewise linearity,
thus l represents the slope of desert utility when the agent receives less than she feels she deserves and g represents the slope when the agent receives more. To ensure that an agent su¤ers a desert loss when she receives less than she feels she deserves, i.e., L (4 i ) < 0; we assume that l > 0:
Desert guilt (De…nition 1) implies that g < 0 while desert elation (De…nition 2) implies that g > 0:
Note that with piecewise linearity there is no longer a distinction between local and global desert guilt or between local and global desert elation, and our assumption of loss aversion boils down to assuming that l > g: Applications of loss aversion often use a piecewise-linear functional form (for some recent examples see Crawford and Meng, 2011, and Prowse, 2012) ; in particular, Gill and Stone's (2010) analysis of desert in competitive environments assumes piecewise linearity throughout.
Desert equilibrium
Taking the e¤orts of her teammates e i as given, each agent chooses her own e¤ort e i to maximize her utility U i . Having exerted her chosen e¤ort, each agent receives her monetary payo¤ and also observes the e¤ort levels of her teammates. Observability implies that the agents do not have to try to infer other agents'e¤orts from the team output. When an agent's reference point r i depends only on her own e¤ort e i and the sum of her teammates' e¤orts P j6 =i e j , as will be the case in the linear example of Section 6, the assumption of observability is super ‡uous as P j6 =i e j can be inferred perfectly from the agent's monetary payo¤ y i : We restrict attention to pure-strategy Nash equilibria, which we call desert equilibria. 16 4 Equilibrium analysis
No desert
As a benchmark, we …rst solve for equilibrium play when the agents do not have desert preferences.
The equilibrium is symmetric and interior. De…ning social welfare as the sum of utilities, so welfare W P N i=1 U i ; e¤ort in the unique equilibrium is socially too low due to the positive externality inherent in the team production game.
Proposition 1 In the absence of desert, there is a unique and symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which the agents exert strictly positive e¤ ort e e: Equilibrium e¤ ort is strictly lower than the socially optimal e¤ ort level e w :
Proof. See Appendix.
Desert guilt
When agents su¤er from global desert guilt (see De…nition 1), so that they always dislike receiving more than they feel they deserve, desert generates a range of symmetric equilibria around the no-desert equilibrium e e as Proposition 2 illustrates. 17
Proposition 2 When the agents exhibit global desert guilt, a range of symmetric desert equilibria exists around the equilibrium level of e¤ ort in the absence of desert e e; with some equilibria strictly above and some strictly below e e:
1 6 Technically, our game is psychological (Geanakoplos et al., 1989) as agent i 0 s utility depends on her belief about the e¤orts of her teammates via the reference point. In particular, our game falls under Battigalli and Dufwenberg's (2009) framework of a dynamic psychological game as utility depends on terminal node (ex post) beliefs, so beliefs can update during the course of the game (in contrast to Geanakoplos et al., in which utilities only depend on initial beliefs). However, we have assumed that the agents observe each other's e¤orts ex post, so the actual e¤orts pin down these beliefs at the terminal nodes. Thus we do not need to introduce the apparatus of psychological games: we can write payo¤s as a function of actions alone, given the actions determine the …rst-order beliefs. Even in the absence of observability, the set of pure-strategy equilibria would remain the same: the discussion in the third-from-last paragraph of Section 2 in Gill and Stone (2010) also applies here. 1 7 When the agents exhibit neither desert guilt nor desert elation, the proof of Proposition 2 extends naturally to show that there is a range of symmetric equilibria with all equilibria weakly below e e: When the agents exhibit neither desert guilt nor desert elation, D (4i) = 0 when 4i 0 because the agents are indi¤erent to receiving as much as or more than they feel they deserve, but D (4i) < 0 when 4i < 0 because the agents continue to su¤er desert losses when they receive less than they feel they deserve. For a common e¤ort level z e e, the proof of Proposition 2 continues to show that upward deviations are not pro…table when z is close enough to or equal to e e. From part (a) of the proof, all downward deviations reduce standard utility when z e e; and from part (b), local downward deviations increase standard utility when z > e e: Thus, there exists a pro…table downward deviation if and only if z > e e; given that downward deviations do not change desert utility since they give 4i > 0 and hence D = 0:
The intuition is as follows. If an agent increases her work e¤ort above the common e¤ort level of her teammates, she raises the reference point that she feels she deserves above the equal share of the team output that she receives. Thus she su¤ers a desert loss as she receives less than she feels she deserves. If, instead, the agent reduces her work e¤ort below that of her teammates, she su¤ers from desert guilt as her deserved reference point falls below an equal share of team output, and so she receives more than she feels she deserves. Thus, starting from a common e¤ort level, desert considerations reduce both the incentive to increase and to decrease e¤ort. When the common e¤ort level is not too far from the no-desert equilibrium, these desert considerations dominate, thus generating a symmetric equilibrium. Essentially, desert forges an endogenous complementarity between agents' e¤orts by giving them incentives to match the e¤orts of their teammates in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 tells us that, perhaps unsurprisingly, desert guilt can make the agents work harder in equilibrium. 18 Thus desert guilt, which as noted in the Introduction may itself be underpinned by a desire to conform to a meritocratic social norm, can give rise to a speci…c social norm of cooperation in our team production setting: desert guilt can make cooperation normatively appropriate for an agent, conditional on her teammates adhering to the norm of cooperative behavior. Once a norm of cooperation starts to become established, desert guilt can help to ensure that the agents stick to the norm without the need for any external pressure or sanctions. In practice, however, we might expect desert guilt to interact with external enforcement mechanisms such as public shame and punishment in forming and underpinning social norms of cooperation. 19 The importance of social norms suggests that employers using teams might try to mold perceptions of norms by, for instance, providing team members with information about e¤ort levels in other similar, successful teams.
More unexpectedly, with desert guilt there is a whole range of possible symmetric equilibria, some of which involve less e¤ort than in the absence of desert considerations. Our theory of desert thus endogenously generates behavior that is consistent with both positive and negative reciprocity, since agents match the level of cooperation of their teammates. 1 8 Kandel and Lazear (1992) and Mohnen et al. (2008) study the e¤ect of peer pressure on e¤ort in a team production setting. Kandel and Lazear assume that peer pressure operates linearly, and so raises e¤ort in the unique symmetric equilibrium. Mohnen et al. assume that the peer pressure function is convex, and so has no e¤ect on equilibrium e¤ort in a single-stage game. Corgnet et al. (2011 Corgnet et al. ( , 2013 show experimentally that peer monitoring increases peer pressure in teams. 1 9 See Young (1998) , Bicchieri (2006) and Krupka and Weber (2009) for further discussion and experimental evidence of the role of social norms and the importance of context and expectations in how norms drive behavior.
A number of experiments provide evidence that a large proportion of subjects in contribution games exhibit conditionally cooperative behavior. In linear public good games, Fischbacher et al. (2001) , Croson (2007) , and Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) elicit contribution schedules, …nding that a majority of subjects show a positive relationship between desired contribution levels and the group average, while Falk et al. (2013) …nd that the same individual contributes more to a public good when he is a member of a group with higher average contributions. In these types of linear public good experiments, contributions are monetary and tend to fall over time towards the sel…sh Nash equilibrium. However, with real e¤ ort in a team production setting van Dijk et al. (2001) …nd no free-riding on average, with no tendency for the average amount of free-riding to increase over time. We would expect deservingness to be more salient when subjects exert real e¤ort; thus in an environment with real e¤ort desert-type considerations should be better able to sustain cooperative behavior over time. In non-linear public good experiments (with interior sel…sh Nash equilibria) average contributions sometimes fall below the sel…sh Nash equilibrium level, suggesting negative reciprocity (see Isaac and Walker, 1998 , Cason et al., 2002 , 2004 , and the survey by Laury and Holt, 2008) .
We stress, however, that the mechanism which introduces reciprocity into our framework is di¤erent to that which drives intentions-based theories of reciprocal altruism. Intentions-based models explain conditional cooperation by assuming that agents like to reciprocate kindness by helping those who are kind to them but hurting those who are mean to them (see for instance Rabin, 1993 , Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004 , and Falk and Fischbacher, 2006 . The perceived kindness of an action is determined by the perceived intention of the agent, which introduces hierarchies of beliefs into utility. In contrast, our theory of desert predicts reciprocal behavior without the need to introduce beliefs about motives or intentions of other agents. 20
Desert elation
When agents exhibit local desert elation (see De…nition 2), so the agents actively like receiving slightly more than they feel they deserve, Proposition 3 shows that e¤ort in a symmetric equilibrium must decline compared to the case where the agents do not have desert preferences.
2 0 Some authors impose reciprocity by simply assuming that certain actions induce a reciprocal response without any consideration of intentions, which of course can give rise to multiple equilibria. In various team production-type settings Sugden (1984) , Rob and Zemsky (2002) and Huck et al. (2012) impose positive reciprocity, Sugden by assuming that at a minimum agents want to match the lowest of their rivals'e¤orts, Rob and Zemsky by assuming that the greater the degree of cooperation in the previous period, the more employees want to cooperate now, and Huck et al. by assuming that the strength of a preference for conforming to a social norm is increasing in the degree of conformity of the other players.
Proposition 3 When agents exhibit local desert elation, e¤ ort in any symmetric desert equilibrium is strictly lower than the equilibrium level of e¤ ort in the absence of desert e e.
Local desert elation implies that, starting from a common level of e¤ort, the local incentive to reduce e¤ort is now higher than in the absence of desert considerations. Agents like receiving more than they feel they deserve, and by reducing e¤ort an agent lowers her deserved reference point below the equal share of team output that she receives. Thus no common e¤ort level at or above the no-desert equilibrium e e can form a symmetric equilibrium, as the agents would want to slack o¤ to enjoy some desert elation. The linear example in Section 6 illustrates that a range of symmetric equilibria may exist below e e: In this range, the common e¤ort level is low enough that the desert elation from deviating to an even lower level of e¤ort is outweighed by the reduction in standard utility U i :
We can also show that a range of symmetric equilibria must exist when the weight on desert elation becomes su¢ ciently small. To formalize this, we introduce explicit weights on desert utility relative to standard utility, as follows:
G (4 i ; g ) = g G (4 i ) ;
l g > 0;
(8)
Thus, l represents the weight on desert losses and g the weight on desert elation or guilt. We continue to make the same assumptions on L (4 i ) and G (4 i ) as before. The assumption that g > 0 ensures that G (4 i ; g ) exhibits local desert elation or guilt if and only if G (4 i ) does; since G 0 (0; g ) = g G 0 (0) : It also ensures that G (4 i ; g ) exhibits global desert elation or guilt if and only if G (4 i ) does. The assumption that l > 0 ensures that L (4 i ; l ) < 0 when 4 i < 0; given L (4 i ) < 0; that is, desert losses continue to be painful. The assumption that l g ensures that L 0 (0; g ) > G 0 (0; g ) ; given L 0 (0) > G 0 (0) ; that is, we continue to have loss aversion for small stakes.
For given l and g ; the new desert utility function D (4 i ; l ; g ) = L (4 i ; l ) 1 4 i <0 +G (4 i ; g ) 1 4 i >0 retains all properties of the old desert utility function D (4 i ) = L (4 i ) 1 4 i <0 + G (4 i ) 1 4 i >0 : Thus, Propositions 2 and 3 continue to hold. However, we can now complement Proposition 3 by showing that with desert elation, not only can there be no symmetric equilibrium with e¤ort at or above the equilibrium level in the absence of desert e e, there must also exist a range of equilibria below e e when the weight on desert elation is small.
Proposition 4 When agents exhibit local desert elation, a range of symmetric desert equilibria exists if the weight g on the desert elation component of utility is su¢ ciently small, with all equilibria strictly below the equilibrium level of e¤ ort in the absence of desert e e.
The intuition is as follows. When the common level of e¤ort is close to but below the equilibrium level of e¤ort in the absence of desert, agents have no incentive to deviate by working harder than their teammates, since the desert losses that they would su¤er from receiving less than they feel they deserve would exceed the gain in standard utility. When the weight on desert elation is su¢ ciently small, they also have no incentive to deviate by working less hard than their teammates, since the desert elation that they would gain from receiving more than they feel they deserve would not exceed the loss in standard utility from the deviation.
E¢ ciency with desert preferences
In this section, we evaluate the welfare properties of the equilibria given the desert preferences exhibited by the agents. Remember that we de…ned social welfare as the sum of utilities, so W = P N i=1 U i . 21 Part (i) of the following proposition tells us that under desert guilt there is a unique welfare-maximizing level of e¤ort (which is the same as the e¢ cient level under standard preferences). Part (ii) tells us that it is always better for the agents to coordinate on a symmetric equilibrium closer to the welfare-maximizing level. Thus, …xing desert preferences, the greater the success of the agents in using desert concerns to overcome the free-rider problem in the team production game by coordinating on a higher-e¤ort equilibrium, the higher is social welfare, so long as there is no desert equilibrium involving e¤ort above the e¢ cient level. If agents exhibit desert guilt, the latter condition may not hold, in which case desert guilt can push the agents to work too hard in equilibrium.
Proposition 5
(i) If the agents exhibit global desert guilt, there is a unique socially optimal level of e¤ ort e w (which is the same as in the absence of desert preferences).
(ii) Given desert guilt or desert elation, and assuming the agents play a symmetric desert equilibrium with strictly positive e¤ ort, welfare is concave in e¤ ort with a maximum at e w : Thus, when there is a range of equilibria with an upper bound below e w ; welfare is increasing in the level of e¤ ort that the agents coordinate on.
The importance of loss aversion
In this section, we consider explicitly which of our results depend on the assumption of loss aversion.
Loss aversion (or more speci…cally, the assumption that desert utility is kinked at the reference point) is necessary to derive Proposition 2. Without it, desert concerns would not generate a range for 4 i > 0. Thus, if there were no kink in desert utility at 4 i = 0, it would have to be the case that @D (4 i ) =@e i = 0 when 4 i = 0. Therefore, at any common e¤ort level z the derivative of desert utility would drop out of the …rst-order condition, and so by the proof of Proposition 1 there would be a unique z satisfying the …rst-order condition, ruling out a range of symmetric equilibria.
Proposition 3 would hold even if the agents were not loss averse. In the absence of a kink in desert utility, agents would still want to deviate downward from the equilibrium level of e¤ort without desert in order to experience desert elation. Loss aversion is necessary for Proposition 4 to hold in general. For example, there would be a unique symmetric equilibrium in the linear example of Section 6 in the absence of a kink in desert utility. Finally, Proposition 5 would continue to hold in the absence of loss aversion.
Inequity aversion as a special case of desert
Our notion of desert can be seen as a generalization of distributional concern models to situations in which e¤ort choices a¤ect the distribution that is perceived to be fair or equitable. Desertconcerned agents care not just about the distribution of monetary payo¤s, but also about how the distribution came about. Indeed, our notion of desert is related to the inequity-aversion models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) , and one of the aims of this paper is to clarify this relationship in a team production setting. Inequity-averse agents, like desert-concerned agents, care about the distribution of resources in addition to their own material payo¤s. Inequity aversion over monetary payo¤s alone plays no role in our team production setting because all the agents receive the same equal share of the team output. Desert-concerned agents, by contrast, care about the relationship between the distribution of monetary payo¤s and the distribution of agents' e¤orts, and not just about the brute distribution of money. However, agents might be inequity averse over monetary payo¤s net of e¤ ort costs, in which case they too will be concerned with the relationship between money and e¤ort. 22
In fact, it turns out that Fehr and Schmidt (1999) inequity aversion over money net of e¤ort costs is a special case of our more general notion of desert: we show below that inequity aversion over money net of e¤ort costs corresponds to a particular form of the reference point that is felt to be deserved, while our theory of desert leaves open the form of the functional relationship between e¤orts and deservingness. Also, for analytical tractability Fehr and Schmidt (1999) impose piecewise-linear loss aversion, while our theory allows desert utility to take on arbitrary non-linear shapes around the kink implied by loss aversion.
If we apply Fehr and Schmidt's (1999) model of inequity aversion (equation (1) at p. 822) to our team production game, and assume aversion to di¤erences in monetary payo¤s net of e¤ort costs, then:
max fC(e j ) C(e i ); 0g ; (10) 2 2 A few papers analyze the consequences of inequity aversion over monetary payo¤s net of e¤ort costs. Demougin and Fluet (2003) evaluate the impact in tournaments, Kölle et al. (2011) study the impact on contributions to a public good (focusing on the role of initial wealth di¤erences, they …nd that a continuum of equilibria may exist), and a burgeoning literature looks at the implications for contract design (Itoh, 2004 , Desiraju and Sappington, 2007 , Rey Biel, 2008 , Bartling and von Siemens, 2010 , Bartling, 2011 , von Siemens, 2011 , 2012 .
where , > 0 and 2 [0; 1) : 23 Note that monetary payo¤s drop out of the comparison terms because y i = y j = f P N i=1 e i =N for all i; j pairs. With just two agents, it is straightforward to see that (10) is a special case of our model of desert. The reference point that agent i feels she deserves is then given by:
which satis…es Assumption 1 and our general notion of desert (1). Money utility is linear, so (y i ) = y i : Desert utility D (4 i ) takes the piecewise-linear form outlined in the second paragraph of Section 3.3, with l = , g = and 4 i = y i r i = C(e j ) C(e i ):
The assumption of loss aversion, i.e., that l > g; corresponds to > which always holds in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) given > 0 and 0: Thus we have the following result.
Proposition 6 When there are two agents, our model of desert nests inequity aversion over monetary payo¤ s net of e¤ ort costs as a special case.
When the aversion to advantageous inequity is strict, i.e., > 0; the agents exhibit global desert guilt (De…nition 1) as G 0 (0) = < 0 and G (4 i ) = 4 i < 0 for all 4 i > 0: Thus Proposition 2 applies. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) do not allow agents to like advantageous inequity, i.e., they exclude the case where < 0: Nonetheless, we also consider this case. When < 0; the agents exhibit local desert elation (De…nition 2) as G 0 (0) = > 0. Thus Proposition 3 applies, so long as we maintain the assumption of loss aversion so > :
When there are more than two agents, the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model, outlined above in (10), involves a series of pairwise comparisons. To see the connection between inequity aversion over money net of e¤ort costs and our model of desert, we therefore need to broaden our model of desert to also allow for pairwise desert comparisons.
Let q (e i ; e j ; e ij ) represent how much more or less agent i feels that she deserves relative to agent j; where e ij represents the vector of e¤ort choices of all the other agents: In order to satisfy our general notion of desert (1), which says that agent i feels she deserves more (less) than agent j if and only if she works harder (less hard), we assume that:
q (e i ; e j ; e ij ) T 0 , e i T e j :
Letting 4 ij q (e i ; e j ; e ij ) ; the desert utility component of total utility U i now takes the following form:
where the properties of D (4 ij ) match those previously imposed on D (4 i ) in Section 3.2. Thus a given pairwise comparison induces a desert loss when agent i feels she deserves more than agent j so q (e i ; e j ; e ij ) > 0 and hence 4 ij < 0; and induces desert elation or guilt when i feels she deserves less than j so q (e i ; e j ; e ij ) < 0 and hence 4 ij > 0: This generalization nests our earlier model of desert when we set q (e i ; e j ; e ij ) = ( (y i ) (r i )), so 4 ij = 4 i = (y i ) (r i ) for all i; j pairs, and hence desert utility P j6 =i D (4 ij ) = (N 1) = D (4 i ) = D ( (y i ) (r i )). 24
The generalization also nests inequity aversion over money net of e¤ort costs, given by (10), when (y i ) = y i ; q (e i ; e j ; e ij ) = C(e i ) C(e j ) so 4 ij = C(e j ) C(e i ); and D (4 ij ) takes the same piecewise-linear form as D (4 i ) in the two-agent case above with l = , g = , and l > g as > . Thus we get the following result.
Proposition 7 When there are more than two agents, a generalization of our model of desert to allow for pairwise desert comparisons continues to nest inequity aversion over monetary payo¤ s net of e¤ ort costs as a special case.
Linear example
In this section we linearize our model in order to work with an analytically tractable example.
We undertake this exercise for a number of reasons. First, the analysis clari…es the more abstract results above in an applied setting. Second, we can say more in the example: in particular we can rule out asymmetric desert equilibria and we …nd a range of equilibria with desert elation. Third, the example allows us to get a feel for how the range of equilibria varies with the parameters of the model. Fourth, we are able to derive results about how desert concerns a¤ect the optimal team size. Finally, we hope that the example will prove useful in future applied theoretical and empirical work.
Equilibrium in the linear example
We linearize monetary utility, so that (y i ) = y i ; and we linearize team output as a function of e¤orts, so that f P N i=1 e i = P N i=1 e i : We assume that the cost of e¤ort function is quadratic, i.e., C(e i ) = ce 2 i =2 with c > 0, so marginal cost is linearized. We further assume that the deserved reference point takes the form given by (3), with r i = 0 when P N i=1 e i = 0; which gives r i = e i due to the linearity of the team output function f: 25 Finally, we assume that desert utility D (4 i ) takes the piecewise-linear form described in the …nal paragraph of Section 3.3, so l > 0 represents the slope of desert utility when the agent receives less than she feels she deserves and g represents the slope when the agent receives more. Our assumption of loss aversion implies that l > g: As noted in Section 3.3, under piecewise linearity there is no distinction between local and global desert guilt or between local and global desert elation, so we will simply refer to desert guilt when g < 0 and desert elation when g > 0: Under these conditions, we get the following result.
Proposition 8
(i) In the absence of desert, there is a unique and symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in which the agents exert e¤ ort e e = 1 cN > 0; which is strictly lower than the socially e¢ cient level e w = 1 c : (ii) With desert, any e¤ ort e 2 1 (iii) Desert guilt (g < 0) gives a range of symmetric desert equilibria around the equilibrium level of e¤ ort in the absence of desert e e: The top of the range tends to the socially e¢ cient level of e¤ ort e w as g tends to 1:
(iv) Desert elation (g > 0) implies that equilibrium e¤ ort is always strictly lower than the equilibrium level in the absence of desert e e, with a range of symmetric desert equilibria when g < 1 N 1 and a unique symmetric desert equilibrium at zero e¤ ort when g 1 N 1 :
2 5 Our meritocratic notion of desert given by (1) explicitly incorporates relative concerns: whether an agent feels she deserves more or less than a teammate depends on whether she has worked harder or less hard than that teammate. The reference point formulation given by (3) implements this by assuming that an agent feels she deserves a share of team output equal to her share of e¤ort. The linearity of the team output function f collapses this particular reference point to ri = ei: Therefore, ri no longer depends directly on the e¤orts of agent i's teammates, although the share of team output felt to be deserved, given by ei= P N i=1 ei ; continues to do so, and our general notion of desert (1) continues to be satis…ed. If we had wished to use a reference point in the linear example for which ri continued to depend directly on the e¤orts of teammates, we could instead have used the following reference point: ri = k (ei s i) + P N i=1 ei =N for k > 0 and s i = P j6 =i ej = (N 1) ; where k (ei s i) represents how much more or less than her equal share of team output the agent feels that she deserves as a linear function of the di¤erence between her e¤ort and the average of that of her teammates. This ri satis…es Assumption 1 and our general notion of desert (1), and collapses to ri = ei only when k = (N 1) =N: Using this ri; for any k > 0 the range of desert equilibria given in Proposition 8(ii) continues to hold when we replace l (N 1) =N by lk and g (N 1) =N by gk:
Part (i) corresponds to Proposition 1 for the more general model. Part (ii) gives us the range of symmetric equilibria with desert as an explicit function of the parameters of the linear example.
Part (ii) also tells us that in this linear example there can be no asymmetric equilibria. We were not able to rule these out in our more general model. Part (iii) con…rms Proposition 2, but further tells us that as g tends to 1; so desert utility with guilt tends to be as steep as money utility, we approach social e¢ ciency if the agents coordinate on the highest-e¤ort equilibrium. Part (iv) con…rms Proposition 3, and also con…rms that a range of equilibria exists when desert elation is not too strong.
We now look at how the range of equilibria given by part (ii) changes with the strength of desert preferences. When desert elation becomes weaker or desert guilt becomes stronger (i.e., g falls), the highest feasible equilibrium level of e¤ort goes up. When desert losses become more strongly felt (i.e., l rises), the lowest feasible equilibrium level of e¤ort goes down. With desert guilt (g < 0); the di¤erence between the highest feasible equilibrium level of e¤ort and the no-desert level as a proportion of the no-desert level e e = (cN ) 1 is given by g (N 1) > 0. This proportion is increasing in the strength of desert guilt and in the number of agents N:
Optimal team size in the linear example
Next, we apply our linear example to consider how desert concerns a¤ect the optimal team size. 26 Fixing the number of workers N; we ask how a principal whose objective is to maximize welfare would want to divide the agents into T 2 [1; N ] equally sized teams. More speci…cally, letting team size be given by S = N=T , we …nd the team size S 2 [1; N ] that maximizes welfare.
We restrict attention to the case with desert guilt, so g < 0; and we assume that teams always succeed in coordinating on the Pareto-dominant symmetric equilibrium within the set of equilibria available to the team. To simplify the analysis, we further assume that team size does not need to be integer valued and that each team member's utility depends only her own e¤ort and that of her teammates (so desert utility does not depend on inter-team comparisons): formally, we assume that each agent acts as if she is a member of just one team and has S 1 teammates, where S need not be integer valued, giving her U i = y i + g (y i r i ) 1 y i r i >0 + l (y i r i ) 1 y i r i <0 ce 2 i =2; where y i = (e i + (S 1) s i ) =S, s i is the average e¤ort of agent i 0 s teammates, and r i = e i as in Section 6.1.
Without any further structure, the optimal team size S = 1, and so the optimal number of teams T = N; since an agent operating alone as a single-agent team would always produce the e¢ cient level of output e w = 1=c. The optimality of single-agent teams is due to the fact that agents operating together in multi-agent teams create a free-rider problem with no corresponding advantage. To make the problem interesting, we now assume that splitting agents into more teams creates an exogenous cost to the principal. In particular, we assume a quadratic exogenous cost function given by kT 2 =2 for k > 0: These costs could represent, for example, the cost of duplicated e¤orts and outputs when agents operate in separate teams or the administrative costs of organizing, supervising and monitoring multiple teams.
We now consider how the level of g; which captures the extent of desert guilt, a¤ects the optimal team size (since we have assumed that teams coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, the extent to which desert losses cause pain l is not relevant). To be clear, we are not thinking of a principal who can in ‡uence g; instead, we are interested in how the level of g a¤ects the team size that the principal would want to choose in order to maximize welfare.
Proposition 9 For g 2 ( 1; 0) ; the optimal team size is given by S = min n N; (g+1) 2 +N ck (g+1) 2 o : For g 1; S = N: As g falls, and so desert guilt becomes stronger, the optimal team size weakly rises.
The intuition is straightforward. The greater the degree of desert guilt, the more the free-rider problem in teams is mitigated, assuming as we do here that the team members coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Thus, the greater the degree of desert guilt, the less costly it is to increase team size to avoid the exogenous cost of running multiple teams. (that is, Propositions 2-5) continue to hold. As we noted in Section 3.3, Assumption 1 is compatible with several di¤erent conceptions of one's 'just deserts'. Proposition 2 continues to hold because, by the same logic as in the proof of the proposition for the identical-agent case, there will be an agent-speci…c range of common e¤ort levels z around the equilibrium level of e¤ort in the absence of desert e e from which agent i has no incentive to deviate, given by [e e i ; e e + i ] where i > 0 and i > 0: Whereas every agent's range is the same when agents are identical, and so corresponds to the range of equilibrium e¤orts, when agents have di¤erent reference point functions, the i and i can vary across agents. This means that the range of symmetric desert equilibria is given by the intersection of these agent-speci…c ranges, where the bounds are determined by the agent with the smallest i and the agent with the smallest i . The proof of Proposition 4 extends in analogous way to that of Proposition 2, noting that g needs to be small enough that no agent has an incentive to deviate downward. The proofs of Propositions 3 and 5 extend immediately.
Similarly, our results in Section 4 continue to hold when agents have di¤erent desert utility functions, if all agents exhibit either desert guilt or desert elation. Propositions 2 and 5 hold when all agents exhibit desert guilt and Propositions 3, 4 and 5(ii) hold when all agents exhibit desert elation. Proposition 3 extends to the case where some agents exhibit desert guilt but others exhibit desert elation: any agent who exhibits desert elation has an incentive to undercut common e¤ort levels at or above the equilibrium level of e¤ort in the absence of desert e e; since by doing so she gains elation from receiving more than she feel she deserves. This suggests that a principal who can choose the composition of di¤erent work teams should concentrate agents who exhibit desert elation in the same team so that they do not disrupt more e¢ cient equilibria that can be sustained among agents that all exhibit desert guilt.
Conclusion
In this paper we developed a theoretical framework to study the strategic implications of desert considerations when agents work in teams. Our notion of desert can be seen as a generalization of distributional concern models to situations in which e¤ort choices a¤ect the distribution that is perceived to be fair or equitable. We have focused on the strategic implications of desert for the team members themselves. However, we hope that our framework and insights will provide a useful building block for future research evaluating optimal responses by various actors to agents'desert concerns, e.g., employers deciding whether or not to use teams in the workplace and designing team incentive schemes given employees with desert concerns, policy-makers deciding how to tax partnerships and team-based bonuses when participants have desert concerns, and workers deciding whether or not to join teams given their own and others'desert concerns.
Our main result is that desert concerns create multiple equilibria when agents face team incentives, which, when agents su¤er from desert guilt, include equilibria that approach or even exceed the e¢ cient e¤ort level. Thus, at least to the extent that agents are able to coordinate on high-e¤ort equilibria, we should expect free-riding to be less of a problem when agents are motivated to ensure that they don't get more than they deserve. We also found that, when there are exogenous costs to splitting agents into more teams, the optimal team size increases in the strength of desert guilt.
Thus, employers and workers alike have reason to embrace team incentive schemes when equitable norms are pervasive, and they have reason to promote transparency about individual team members'contributions to the team output in order to facilitate coordination on superior equilibria. It is important that the equitable norms are pervasive, if the advantages of desert concerns are to be realized, since agents who enjoy getting more than they deserve disrupt the superior equilibria. So workers who have properly internalized equitable norms will be more likely to join teams that are full of like-minded agents, and employers have reason to ensure that any renegade agents are kept apart from those who have properly internalized such norms.
In addition to providing a building block for future theoretical research that improves our understanding of the use of team incentives in the workplace beyond the insights that we have developed here, we hope that our model will spur testing to determine whether agents who interact in teams behave as if desert concerns matter to them. Finally, we hope that researchers will use our framework to analyze the equilibrium implications of desert in broader settings where, for instance, teammates interact repeatedly, or simultaneously cooperate in teams but compete for promotions.
Thus for any e i ; U i is strictly concave; and furthermore U 0 i < 0 for high enough e i given that C 0 is unbounded above. Therefore a strict best response e i exists and is unique for any e i .
No asymmetric equilibrium can exist. Suppose one did. The agent(s) with the highest e¤ort must have U 0 i = 0: Any agent with a strictly lower e¤ort will share the same 0 f N f 0 N and have a strictly lower C 0 and so will have a strict incentive to increase e¤ort.
Di¤erentiating U 0 i w.r.t. a common e¤ort level z:
Thus a unique symmetric equilibrium e e > 0 exists where e e = C 0 1 0 f (N e e) N f 0 (N e e) N , as U 0 i > 0 for z = 0 while U 0 i < 0 for high enough z given that C 0 is unbounded above. Consider now the socially optimal vector of e¤orts. Because C 00 > 0 and Y depends on P N i=1 e i , all the agents'e¤orts must be the same at a social optimum. At a common e¤ort level z:
Any social optimum must have e w > e e, as at z = e e @W @z > 0: A unique optimum must exist where e w = C 0 1 0 f (N e w ) N f 0 (N e w ) N N ; as W is strictly concave in z and @W @z < 0 for high enough z given that C 0 is unbounded above.
Proof of Proposition 2. Consider agent i's incentive to deviate from a common e¤ort level z > 0. We show that for any z su¢ ciently close to the no-desert equilibrium e¤ort e e > 0, the reduction in i 0 s desert utility D(4 i ) arising from such a deviation outweighs any gain in standard utility U i ; so e i = z is a best response to z i ; that is to the vector of others'e¤orts e i in which e j = z 8j 6 = i.
From Assumption 1(i) and 0 > 0, 4 i T 0 , y i T r i , e i S z: Thus e i = z ) D(4 i ) = D(0) = 0; while a deviation upward to e i > z ) D(4 i ) < 0 as L(4 i ) < 0 for 4 i < 0; and a deviation downward to e i < z ) D(4 i ) < 0 as G(4 i ) < 0 for 4 i > 0 by the assumption of global desert guilt. Thus any deviation strictly reduces D; so deviations must increase U i su¢ ciently to compensate.
(a) First consider z 2 (0; e e] : From the proof of Proposition 1, U 00 i < 0 with U 0 i < 0 for e i su¢ ciently high, and U 0 i (z; z i ) 0 given z e e. Thus downward deviations strictly reduce U i ; while the strict concavity of U i in e i and its continuity in z ensures that large enough upward deviations must always reduce U i ; i.e., 9b e > e e such that 8z e e; U i (e i ; z i ) U i (z; z i ) ) e i 2 [z; b e] : As all deviations strictly reduce D; we can therefore restrict attention to deviations with e i 2 (z; b e] :
Now take a given z 2 (0; e e] : The gain in U i from deviating to a speci…c e i 2 (z; b e] is bounded above by U 
Thus, as a su¢ cient condition, deviation to any e i 2 (z; b e] strictly reduces U i if U 
Thus local downward deviations strictly increase U i ; so we cannot have an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4. Part (a) of the proof of Proposition 2 shows that, given a common e¤ort level z < e e; an upward deviation from z strictly reduces U i when z is close enough to e e: Take a given b z < e e that lies strictly within the range of z for which there is no upward deviation incentive. 
Thus, lim g #0 sup e i 2[0;b z) D(4 i ; l ; g ) b z e i = 0; and hence the no-downward-deviation condition is satis-…ed when g is su¢ ciently close to 0 (noting that sup e i 2[0;b z) G(4 i ) b
z e i must exist, since lim e i "b z G(4 i ) b
). By continuity, the su¢ cient no-downward-deviation condition continues to hold for a range of common e¤ort levels z around b z; and by construction b z lies strictly within the range of z for which there is no incentive to deviate upward. Thus, a range of (strict) symmetric equilibria exists for g su¢ ciently small. Finally, from Proposition 3 all the equilibria must be strictly below e e.
Proof of Proposition 5. Note …rst that if the agents exhibit global desert guilt (De…nition 1), desert utility D (4 i ) 0 at any vector of e¤orts. Note second that when the agents all exert a common e¤ort level z > 0; D (4 i ) = 0: from Assumption 1 each agent's deserved reference point matches the equal share of team output that she receives, so 4 i = 0. Part (i) then follows as when all agents exert the socially optimal level of e¤ort in the absence of desert, given by e w > 0 from Proposition 1, the sum of standard utilities P N i=1 U i is maximized and D (4 i ) = 0, so W = P N i=1 U i is maximized also.
Next note that, from (18), welfare in the absence of desert is strictly concave in a common e¤ort level z around e w : When considering z > 0 in a symmetric desert equilibrium, D (4 i ) = 0 from above, so welfare with desert preference matches welfare without desert. Thus Part (ii) follows immediately from this concavity.
Proof of Proposition 8. ; 0 : But this gives a contradiction given l > g and e max i > e min i ; so there can be no asymmetric desert equilibria. (iii) Follows immediately from parts (i) and (ii) given l > 0 and g < 0:
(iv) Follows immediately from parts (i) and (ii) given l > g > 0:
Proof of Proposition 9. By an argument analogous to that in the proof of Proposition 8(ii), the range of symmetric equilibria is the same as given in Proposition 8(ii), replacing N with S:
Suppose …rst that g 2 ( 1; 0) : Given we have assumed that agents coordinate on the Paretodominant symmetric equilibrium, and given S = N T , equilibrium e¤ort is: e = 1 cS g S 1 cS = (g + 1) Sg Sc = T (g + 1) N g N c :
In this symmetric equilibrium, y i = r i = e ; and so team welfare is given by S e c(e ) 2 2 : There are N S such teams, so overall welfare is given by:
The …rst-order condition is @W @T = 1 c (g + 1) 1 N c (T (g + 1) N g) (g + 1) T k = 0;
which is satis…ed when T = (g+1) 2 N (g+1) 2 +N ck : Welfare is strictly concave since @ 2 W @T 2 = 1 N c (g + 1) 2 k < 0: Therefore, the …rst-order condition implies that T = max : Finally, S is weakly decreasing in g given @ (g+1) 2 +N ck (g+1) 2 @g = 2N ck (g + 1) 3 < 0:
Suppose second that g 1: Then e = e w = 1 c given agents coordinate on the Pareto-dominant symmetric equilibrium. Thus, S = N since any S maximizes welfare net of the exogenous team cost, but S = N minimizes the team cost.
